In a first step, the basic logic of aging will be investigated in a simple dynamic model. In particular, the investigation points out the existence of the demographic distribution mass and its meaning for intergenerational income development. It proves that the demographic distribution mass makes it possible for wages and pensions to grow simultaneously in an aging and stagnating economy.
A theoretical investigation and a simulation of the German case
INTRODUCTION
Like many other OECD countries, the German society is expected to age significantly over the coming decades. And like in many other OECD countries, there is currently an intensive discussion in Germany about how to cope with the increasing burden that follows from this aging. Specifically, in the German case, the general perception of the problem appears to be about the following:
Currently, the German pension system is dominated by a public so-called 'pay-as-you-go' system: The pensions of year X are (almost) completely financed by transfers raised from the active population in that very year (Homburg 2000 , Börsch-Supan/Wilke 2004 . Hence, the system mostly consists of intergenerational income redistribution and not of capital accumulation. Moreover, since 1957 the German 1 I am grateful to Inga Schroeder, Stefanie Thiel, Rolf Johannes, the audience of the HHL-colloquium and the anonymous reviewers of this Journal for useful comments that have helped me to improve the quality of the paper significantly. However, the responsibility for any errors or omissions rests with the author. pension system has become dynamic as it ties the development of pensions to the development of the active population's average income (Steffen 2002) . As a consequence, there is a broad apprehension within the German society that keeping the existing pension system running unchanged would increase the burden on the active population so much that it would have to suffer real income losses, particularly in the 'aging peak,' which is to be expected in the 2030s (Börsch-Supan/Schnabel 1998). This increasing burden would not only harm domestic demand, but moreover choke the active population and force it into the black economy (or abroad) to a considerable extent. All of this would have a negative effect on the economic dynamics and finally 'ruin' the German economy. 2 As a result, the word of a 'pension crisis' have spread. 3 Following, the entire German pension system was put to the test (Siddiqui 1997 , Schmähl 2000 , Börsch-Supan 2000a , Homburg 2000 , Bonin 2002 , Börsch-Supan 2002 . 4 In particular, there was a strong demand to move (at least partially)
away from the old system and turn towards a private, capital-based pension system. There are increasingly more old and increasingly less young people…In the face of such changes, the pension system must be re-adjusted to maintain its effectiveness."
5 One step in this direction, which has already been realized, is the so called 'Riester Rente' based on the Gesetz über die zusätzliche private Altersvorsorge , which became effective on January 1, 2002. an intensive research on pensions. One important stream of this research was a comparison of the existing public pay-as-you-go system with different types of private, capital-based pension systems (Homburg 2000 , Thøgersen 2001 , Karayel 2006 ). In particular, there were (comparative) investigations about the meaning of different pension regimes for capital markets (Lavi/Spivak 1999 , Winter 2002 , domestic investment, domestic demand and economic growth (Börsch-Supan 1995 , Börsch-Supan 1999 as well as on individual returns (Schnabel 1998) . In addition to this, there was an intensive discussion about the consequences of a transformation from one system to the other (Börsch-Supan 2000b) . It soon became clear that a transformation from a pay-as-you-go system to a capital-based pension system would burden the respective generation with both the duties of the old system and the provision for its own pension. In connection with this, the phrase 'the sandwich generation' was coined (Raphael/Schlesinger 1994) . 6 As an alternative, the Swiss model and the meaning of corporate pensions also received some attention (Bütler 1999 ).
However, in all these discussions, one effect has been completely overlooked:
This effect is fairly well known in statistics, but its meaning has never been investigated for aging societies. The effect is of importance for aging, since it produces an 'unbounded' income, ready to be distributed among the generations. In this paper, we refer to this unbounded income as demographic distribution mass.
This paper departs from the origin of all current problems: The income development of the generations as a whole. The particular aim of this paper is to 6 For the German discussion see, for example, the article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April The first step is focused on the theoretical elaboration of the effect. For practical reasons, this analysis is not based on an OLG model, which currently dominates research on pensions, but instead on a continuous dynamic model. The main result of the theoretical part is to proof that it is indeed possible for both pensions and wages to grow simultaneously in an aging and stagnating society.
However, this result is based on the assumption of a dynamic pension system, in that the development of pensions is tied to the development of net wages. Following this, selected alternative pension formulas are investigated. It is shown that these alternative formulas always lead to absolute income reductions for one of the respective generations in the course of aging.
As a result, it becomes clear from the theoretical part of this paper that the possibilities and restrictions of income development in an aging society are mainly determined by two opposing forces: Technical progress on the one hand and aging on the other. Subsequently, the question arises; how do these two opposing forces relate in the real world and, as a consequence, how relevant is the statement that bothpensions and wages -can grow simultaneously in an aging and stagnating society?
What meaning does the demographic distribution mass have for real aging processes? These questions will be answered in a second step exemplarily for the case of the intergenerational income development in Germany from the present through to 2050 (including the 'aging wave' of the 2030s). As a result of the simulation, it can be shown that the burden from increasing pensions alone is of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   5 rather minor importance for German income development. Even under very conservative assumptions, it is not to be expected that aging alone will ever make significant income reductions for one of the generations (or both) necessary -not even at the peak of the aging wave. On the contrary, the simulation shows that incomes can remain stable, even in a contracting economy, as long as the GDP does not decrease by more than 0.45% on average.
Note that the analysis of this paper only concerns different possibilities of income development for the two respective groups, the active population (meaning people actively contributing to the pension system) and pensioners as a whole. This means: The analysis does not take any income differences within the generations into consideration and it does not investigate the income development of other groups, such as the unemployed or children. Additionally, this paper does not contain information on how to reach identified income paths, but rather which income paths are possible for a given development of GDP and a given aging process. Although it might appear so at the first glance, this paper does not introduce any production or growth theory and takes no account of the capital side. As a result, it assumes increases in labour productivity as externally given, coming out of a 'black box.'
Finally, the paper does not refer to how the different intergenerational income developments are realised, but only which different intergenerational income developments are possible. Hence, there is nothing to find about particular pension systems, about public or private, pay-as-you-go or capital-based pensions. This procedure follows the insight that ultimately the pensions paid in period t are always and completely part of the GDP of this very period. With respect to the question of how much pension is to be paid in t, this is always a matter of distribution of this 
THE MODEL
The following model is designed to represent the 'stylised' characteristics of an aging and stagnating economy. For simplification, we assume that the total population of the modelled society, B t , is constant over time (in fact, the population in Germany and a couple of other OECD-countries is actually decreasing):
To focus the analysis on the development of wages, pensions and pension efforts in the course of aging, we will additionally assume that the total population of the modelled society consists of only two different income groups: Firstly, a certain number of W t identical workers and secondly, a certain number of P t identical pensioners at every point in time: 8 7 This insight has already been recognised by Mackenroth (1952) . Of course, this does not mean that we can neglect the fact that the institutional arrangement of pensions has various effects -not only on income distribution, but also on economic growth and, thus, the size of the cake to distribute. For the discussion of the Mackenroth hypothesis see also Feldstein (1977) , Schmähl (1981) The gross output of the economy is entirely produced by the workers and will be completely (and equally) distributed among them, so that their gross income percapita in t is Y t /W t . All pensioners receive an equal per-capita pension of p t . These pensions consist entirely of transfers, which are equally subtracted from the gross income of the workers. Correspondingly, the (gross) output of the economy Y t is distributed as:
In this equation, w t represents the workers' net wages per capita in t, consisting of the gross income minus the pension transfers. Consequently, the per capita pension transfers r t are:
Wages, as well as pensions (per capita), are not assumed to be constant, but rather to change in the course of the aging process. To begin with, we will assume that both incomes do not develop independently of each other, but in the fixed ratio:
of young people -a development, which, of course, only causes the entire process of aging. This development, again, has a relieving effect on the financial burden of the active population. This is the case of a dynamic pension system in that (corresponding to the public pension system in Germany) the development of pensions is linked to the development of (net) wages.
We will model the aging process of the society as a decrease in the number of workers with a constant rate (but decreasing absolute number) over time:
The number of workers in t is then:
Consequently (still holding the assumption of a constant population), the number of pensioners increases relatively to that of workers in the course of time, but with a decreasing rate. In t, the ratio between pensioners and workers is: This technical progress is modelled as a constant increase of the number of efficiency units per worker l t in the course of time with a rate of (it is assumed that the working hours per capita remain constant over time):
The number of efficiency units per worker in t is then:
The efficiency units are nominated so that with one efficiency unit of labour exactly one unit of output can be produced: l t = t ( t denotes the potential per capita output in t). Hence, the development of the gross production potential of the economy is determined by two opposing forces: The increasing labour productivity and the decreasing number of workers:
As a result of (6) and (7), the development of the production potential follows the path:
9 Note that technical progress is a precondition for the stagnation of an aging economy. Without technical progress, any aging economy would be contracting. I will address this point later. 
Finally, we will assume full employment, which means nothing more than that the actual gross product of the economy equals the production potential for every t:
It follows that also the development of the economy's gross product is determined by the interplay of technical progress -the increase of labour productivity -on the one hand, and the aging process -the decrease of the numbers of workers -on the other.
According to (9), three cases can be distinguished: (c) On the contrary, in the case | | < | |, the total output of the economy decreases.
For the time being, we want to turn to case (a) and to investigate the scenario of a 10 This assumption might appear a little heroic for Germany and many other OECD-countries and requires some justification. Primarily it is just another simplification, which spares the necessity of an independent explanation for the development of the economy's gross product (beyond the neoclassical equilibrium framework). However, most of all, this assumption can be justified because it isolates the income effect of aging from effects that result from a change of unemployment in the economy. stagnating economy. It becomes clear from the simulation below that this case comes quite close to the expectations for the development of Germany through to the year 2050. However, it must be emphasised that the basic results of this theoretical part of the paper -the existence and the meaning of the demographic distribution massdo not depend on this assumption. Additionally, this assumption supports the analysis, as it isolates aging from growth and focuses the analysis on the relevant processes. However, this assumption will be relaxed at the end of the theoretical analysis and in particular later in the simulation of the German case.
Analysis of the Income Development in an Aging, Stagnating Economy,

Retaining the Dynamic Pension
Let us first turn to the development of (net) wages in our model. This development is obviously a result of the interplay of two different factors: Firstly, an increase of the gross income in the result of increasing labour productivity and secondly, an increase of pension transfers in the result of aging. The question is, how these two factors combine and how -as a consequence -the per capita (net) wages of the workers will develop in the course of time. According to (3), the per capita net wages in t are:
Because of (2) and (5), (11) can be transformed to: The derivation of the wage with respect to t is:
Because of (2) and (12), (13) can finally be transformed to:
Equation (14) describes the development of the per capita (net) wages in the course of time. It is obvious that under normal conditions (i.e. when , W t , w t > 0 and 0 < < 1) this term is positive, which means nothing more than that the net wages will increase in the course of time. However, because of (5) How do we come to this result; how is it possible that wages and pensions can both increase simultaneously, although the gross product as well as the population of this economy remains constant? The reason for this is an effect, which is fairly well known in statistics, but which, so far, has never been applied to the investigation of aging. In fact, even in our model, one group of the economy has to put up with a decreasing income. This group consist of all workers, who additionally become However, this mechanism should not belie the fact that aging always brings about financial burdens for at least one generation. In the assumed scenario of a dynamic pension, this burden materialises in a continuous increase of the pension ratio. The crucial thing is that this rate lies below the increase of the (per capita) gross income and provides room for net income growth. Hence, 0
t < 1 if 0 < < 1 and so both wages and pensions can increase simultaneously. As a matter of fact, this net income growth is below the productivity growth: A growth, which could be realised for the wages, if there were no aging (of course, in this case the entire economy would grow).
One important implication of this result is that it is possible that both wages and pensions can increase simultaneously even in the third of the above cases -the contracting economy, in that | | < | | and the gross product of the economy decreases.
The critical borderline for income growth in this economy is at the point where wages and pensions are constant over time. In this case, the gross product is: However, the dynamic pension is rather a German specific and even in this case it is fundamentally questioned in the current discussion. Hence, in the following we investigate the effect of three alternative pension formulas: (I) a determination of the pension ratio, (II) a determination of the (absolute) amount of per capita pension transfers, and (III) a linking of the pension to the gross income.
Discussion of the Effect of a Change in the Pension Formula
(I) The current German discussion is dominated by the demand to keep the contribution ratio -i.e. the part of the gross income, which every worker contributes 11 However, | t | (ceteris paribus) decreases in the course of time. to the pension system -constant and to opt out of the dynamic pension system for good. In fact, every increase in the contribution ratio leads to an intensive mediadiscussion, which puts serious pressure on the Federal Government. 12 In the following we will first investigate how the fixing of a particular contribution ratio will affect the income development in our stagnating model economy with a constant population. 13 Therefore, we assume that:
where denotes the (fixed) contribution ratio. In the stagnating economy (with | | = | |), the gross pension revenue is constant due to the fact that the decrease in the number of workers exactly equals the per capita increase in the gross income. The derivation of p t with respect to t is: and employment policy. 'These plans are a fatal consequences of a misguided economic and social policy and of insufficient reforms of the pension system.'…" (own translation). 13 We still assume that the 'contribution ratio' represents all transfers from the active to the inactive 
As a result of a determination of the per capita pension transfer, the workers do not
only enjoy the increase in labour productivity completely; moreover, the entire demographic distribution mass will also be distributed among them.
(III) It is easy to comprehend that, in contrast to (I) and (II), a dynamic linking of the pension to the development of the (per capita) gross income leads to an increase in pensions with the rate of the technical progress. In this case, wages will decrease, as long as W t /B t > p t /w t .
Finally, it becomes clear that only one of the investigated pension formulas results in both a wage and pension increase simultaneously in an aging and stagnating economy (although at the price of an increasing pension ratio): The dynamic pension, which is linked to the development of the (net) wages. All other investigated formulas cause one of the respective income groups to be burdened with absolute income losses in the course of time.
So far, we have concentrated on the theoretical framework. In the following, we now turn to the German case and investigate the expectations for the income development in this particular country. 
SIMULATION OF THE INCOME DEVELOPMENT IN GERMANY THROUGH TO THE YEAR 2050
Up until now, only a theoretical possibility has been expounded. But how relevant is this possibility to understand the real development in aging societies? What meaning does the demographic distribution mass have there? The answer to these questions obviously depends mainly on two developments: Technical progress on the one hand and aging on the other. In the end, whether the theoretical possibility of increasing wages and pensions in an aging and stagnating economy becomes real, merely depends on which of the developments actually predominates in the country.
Consequently, the following simulation is based on assumptions about the development of labour productivity on the one hand and about the demographic development in Germany through to the year 2050 on the other.
However, by now it is impossible to give a reliable prediction for the development of the labour productivity for longer periods. Thus, we have to take a look at the past. constantly increased by rates between 0.5% and 5.2%. The average increase was 2.8%, although it slightly reduced over the course of time -in Germany (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) the average increase of labour productivity was only about 2.0%.
In contrast to the development of labour productivity, the demographic development in Germany can be predicted very accurately. In its forecast, the Statistisches Bundesamt distinguishes between two different scenarios: The development of a long-term net immigration of +100,000 people per year and that of a long term net immigration of +200,000 people per year. Since the retirement age is also relevant for the analysis of the development of the different income groups, we will additionally distinguish between the following two scenarios: An average retirement age of 60 and one of 65.
In all these different scenarios, the total population and the number of workers tend to decrease and that of the pensioners to increase: Consequently, in all different scenarios, the German society is aging. The extent and course of this aging process becomes particularly clear from a view of the age-ratio: The age-ratio records how many pensioners have to be supported on average by one worker and thus gives a clue as to the burden of the active part of a society (i.e. a pension ratio of 0.4 means that on average, one worker has to support 0.4 pensioners). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
Retirement Age of 60
In the first scenario, we are going to simulate the most 'pessimistic' forecast, where the aging of the German society progresses most steeply and on the highest level. For the time being, we will additionally stick to the assumption of a dynamic pension system, where the pension development is tied to that of net wages. The question is,
if and to what extent it is possible for wages and pensions to increase simultaneously in the German case. The continuous line in figure 4 shows the (identical) 14 To isolate the intergenerational income development and that of the demographic distribution mass, we will exclude all people below the age of twenty from the simulation: As in the theoretical part, the total population consists only of those people aged twenty or over. However, all changes in this 'total population' through to 2050 will be completely taken into account, i.e. the above assumption of a 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 If we assume even an average productivity growth of 2% p.a., both wages and pensions can simultaneously increase over the entire time period through to 2050 and the increase in these incomes is not seriously affected by the burdens of the aging for most of the time. 15 This means: Under normal conditions, nobody in Germany necessarily has to fear real income reductions from aging alone! So far, the good news.
The bad news is that a retention of the dynamic pension would considerably increase the pension ratio, according to the simulation, from 20% to over 35%. Again, this increase in pension transfers would remain below the increase in gross wages (per capita), so that the net wages would still increase. However, experience shows that such an increase in burdens always has problematic consequences: In particular, it reduces the motivation of the active part of the population and forces it into the black economy or abroad (Tanzi 1980 , Frey/Weck 1983 , Schneider/Ernste 2000 .
Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that (due to the fact that net wages are still increasing) these are not problems of diminishing wealth, but rather of perception, of attitude towards public burdens, and possibly of international competitiveness.
The relative meaning of aging and pension transfers for the German income development may be highlighted by figure 7: 15 Due to the higher level of income, the demographic distribution mass is larger in this scenario than in the case of an assumed productivity growth of 1%: It is now about € 6.6 billion per year, on average. wages will almost always increase, during the entire time period by about 38 %.
However, the simulation shows that the income effect of an exit from the dynamic pension system is far beyond that of 2% productivity growth: In the first scenario, the income will increase only by about 68%, whereas in the second scenario, it will increase by more than 130%. (This result might not be too surprising if one takes into account that an average productivity growth of about 0.38% is sufficient to maintain wages and pensions during this time period.)
However, fixing the pension ratio at the value of 20% would lead to a considerable decrease in pensions by an average of about 0.36 % p.a., reducing the pensions over the entire period by about 20% (and even by an average of more than 0.8% p.a. over the time period until 2031, the year in which pensions reach their base). At the peak of the 'aging wave' around 2024, the annual decrease in pensions would be even larger than -2% for five and larger than -1.5% for nine years in a row.
In this case, the pensions would indeed 'no longer be secure' (as prophesied many times in the media). For a comparison, we will take a brief look at the most optimistic scenario with a net immigration of +200,000 people per year and a retirement age of 65. Figure One important difference, however, is that the development in scenario 2 takes place at a significantly lower level overall than that of scenario 1: In particular, the pension ratio departs only at roughly 15% in 1998 and approaches only 26% in 2050 in scenario 2 (compared to 20 % in 1998 and 35 % in 2050 in scenario 1). This 
CONCLUSIONS
The results of this paper are somewhat confusing and should be handled with some care: It should not entrap us to play down the problems of aging, assuming that since it does not lead to absolute income reductions, aging does not significantly burden the active population, for at least two reasons: Firstly, increasing pension transfers are not the only consequence of aging, but aging will also affect the costs of health care and perhaps the mental condition of the society. Additionally, aging is not the only burden, the active population has to shoulder in many OECD countries.
Burdens also result from unemployment, domestic and foreign debt, inflating social systems and so on. Hence, the analysis of this paper has to be set within the overall context of economic development. Secondly, even if no real income reductions are necessary, aging always leads to an increased burden for at least one generation. (Siebert 1994) .
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to shift the perception of the problem setting: The main problem of aging is not that it affects the economy's capability to produce an increasing wealth, but that increasing burdens are not accepted by the active population and negatively affect economic dynamics. Hence, aging first and foremost is a problem of psychology and incentives. Nevertheless, in discussions, we must always take the fact into consideration that we cannot stop aging and that there is a social responsibility to provide for this part of the population, which created the economy state from which we are moving away.
Moreover, in an aging society, pensioners constitute an ever growing part of the voting force. We are not too far away from a time when half of the voting population will consist of pensioners or people close to pension age. Faced with this One crucial factor is certainly the visibility of pension duties and their perception as burdens. In this connection, it does not appear to be very supportive when workers find their pension duties explicitly displayed on the pay roll (as it currently is the case in Germany). In this regard, a private, capital-based pension system appears much less problematic, since it gives the active generation the impression of caring for its own old-age provision and not of paying into an anonymous pension system.
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